Afterthoughts. Reply to Comments by Kitcher, Philip
Analyse & Kritik 01/2012 ( c© Lucius & Lucius, Stuttgart) S. 167189
Philip Kitcher
Afterthoughts. Reply to Comments
Abstract: I attempt to respond to the many questions and objections raised by the
commentaries. The responses are grouped by themes, rather than focusing on the
essays in sequence. So there are sections on worries about my analytical history, con-
cerns about my meta-ethical perspective, doubts about my normative stanceand
complaints about my perpetration of a `naturalistic fallacy'.
1. Preliminaries
I am extremely grateful to the authors of these essays, especially because the
misunderstandings are few, while the questions and objections are diverse and
interesting. Although I suspect that my replies will not always settle doubts, I
hope that they will further develop and strengthen the approach begun in The
Ethical Project (EP).
Like Gaul, my book is divided into three parts, and, rather than treat the
individual essays seriatim, it seems better to consider related themes together.
The next three sections move through the three main divisions of EP : first con-
sidering my `analytical history', then turning to my `meta-ethical perspective',
and focusing after that on my `normative stance'. Because questions about the
ability of any version of naturalism to avoid fallacies are so frequent, and be-
cause my attempts at defense are spread over different chapters, I add a final
section in which objections of this common type are taken up (I would like to
say: `decisively rebutted').
2. Doubts about the History
The commentaries voice three different sorts of concerns about my analytical
history. Some of them worry about whether it is possible to reconstruct a history
of human ventures in ethics that deserves serious consideration. Others are more
confident about my aspirations to do that, but think I have some important
details wrong. A last criticism charges that my account is not simply wrong in
detail, but that it is the wrong sort of history, that the framework I have adopted
is somehow askew. I shall take up these different kinds of objection in turn.
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There are some things we know about the history of human ethical life.
We have evidence from early written documents of a substantial body of rules
governing many different spheres of human conduct. Historical sources reveal
subsequent periods during which the ethical views current in a group undergo
change. We can also be certain that, tens or hundreds of thousands of years ago,
our ancestors had no body of ethical lore that they could instill in their offspring,
and that would govern, generation after generation, the actions of members of a
social group.
My analytical history advances hypotheses about the changes that link our
pre-ethical ancestors with the members of Mesopotamian societies, with their
complex collections of norms. Sometimes it is possible to marshal evidence
from archeology, anthropology, primatology, psychology and history to defend
some hypothesis as an account of the changes that actually occurred. When the
evidence is insufficient for that, it is still important to provide an account of how
we could possibly have proceeded from one stage to a hypothetical subsequent
stage. For the aim of the analytical history is to avoid moments of revelation
and to be compatible with the best general accounts we have of the development
of human social life (including, of course, evolutionary theories, biological and
cultural). Notice that, for large parts of EP, the aim is not to specify the causes of
changes but to trace the path our ancestors followed. I am thus often interested
not in pinning down the selective advantage of a particular innovation, but only
in describing a sequence of changes compatible with well-grounded ideas about
the action of selection.
Chrys Mantzavinos (in the guise of his `student') worries that this history
is too `conjectural' to teach us much about ethics, and Cailin O'Connor et al.
raise a similar charge about `speculative genealogy'. In both instances, there's a
failure to distinguish those occasions on which I am explaining how something
could have occurred from those instances in which I offer evidence for a hypoth-
esis about how they actually occurred. If all the first part of EP offered were
a `how possibly' story, then it would be quite illegitimate to use its features to
ground meta-ethical claimsand thus difficult to understand what relevance it
might have. Michael Baurmann, too, offers a number of observations about the
limited significance of my analytical history that depend crucially on not distin-
guishing those parts of the history that I take to be well-supported by empirical
evidence (`how actually explanations') and those parts for which the evidence
is insufficient to discriminate among alternative hypotheses (`how possibly ex-
planations'). The better version of kindred complaints focuses on features of
my narrative for which I attempt to provide evidence, and to argue that the
evidence is insufficient to exclude rival hypotheses.
O'Connor et al. move to this superior version when they emphasize the pos-
sibilities of cooperative behavior arising without any explicit agreement on rules
(although, along the way, they make a telling mistake, in praising me for attend-
ing to the selective advantages conferred by the ethical project (this issue, 54):
to repeat, I am tracing a path, not identifying selective advantages). Quite pos-
sibly our hominid ancestors achieved quite a lot in coordinating their activities
without agreed-on rules: `nice behavior' may have become more prevalent. But,
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contrary to what many authors on the evolution of ethics tend to assume, `nice
behavior'that is conduct we would retrospectively appraise as conforming to
our explicit ethical normsis not the same as behavior about which people re-
flect, and to which they apply rules or paradigms of conduct. To put the point
bluntly: the innovative and illuminating work in evolutionary game theory to
which O'Connor et al. refer (work I also greatly admire) doesn't address the phe-
nomenon to be explained, to wit, how human beings came to have these abilities
to reflect and to appraise. Five thousand years ago there were lots of explicit
rules about, and it's reasonable to think that explicit rule-governed behavior had
been going on for a very large number of generations. My task is to understand
the origins of that.
The insight behind the O'Connor et al. point is that the initial state for
the emergence of normative guidance (in my specific sense) may differ from the
chimp-like condition I foist on our last pre-ethical ancestors in virtue of some
increased cooperation achieved through reaching evolutionary equilibria. Just as
I allow for further evolution of altruistic behavior (for example in alloparenting
within human groups), this insight can be absorbed within the history I propose.
The only serious challenge would come if one thought that the further refine-
ment of altruism or the attainment of cooperation simply removed the problem
of altruism-failures. Since altruism-failures persist in human societies, even given
all our non-rule-mediated coordination and all our further development of altru-
istic tendencies, even in the presence of rules enjoining responding positively to
others, it seems very hard to see how this challenge might be sustained.
Braddock and Rosenberg offer a more extensive set of reasons for amend-
ing my analytic history. They begin by misreading my conservative suggestion
of fifty thousand years as a minimal age for the ethical project. I am glad to
concede to them, as I concede to O'Connor et al., that coordinated behavior of
various sorts emerged before our ancestors acquired normative guidance (again
in my sense of giving and following explicit rules and paradigms), and also that
such behavior was important to the evolution of full language. I am also happy
to suppose that the early stages of the evolution of language are intertwined
with the formulation and following of rules, and that the ethical project began
far earlier than fifty thousand years before the present (that was a minimal age,
and, for my meta-ethical purposes, the longer we have been ethical creatures
the better). Where Braddock and Rosenberg go astray, I think, is in underes-
timating the seriousness of the problem of altruism failures. They point out,
quite correctly, that our hominid ancestors faced a lot of challenges and difficul-
ties. What they overlook is that the problem of altruism failures is a constituent
of all these problems. To the extent that early hominids could work together,
they could meet the challengesor at least, muddle through. Even supposing
that they worked together more successfully than contemporary chimpanzees
and bonobos, their ability to cooperate, and thus to become as successful as
Homo eventually became, was limited by the tendencies of individuals to fail to
support other members of the band, and the consequent propensity for groups
to fall apart.
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Part of the disagreement here consists in what may either be a misunder-
standing or a different interpretation of primatological findings. Braddock and
Rosenberg suppose that all sorts of exciting things happen [l]ong before psycho-
logical altruism kicks in (this issue, 67). Chapter 1 of EP argues that psycholog-
ical altruism is a disposition human beings share with other extant species, and
is almost certainly inherited from some common ancestor of humans and chim-
panzees. But the range and scope of that ancestral psychological altruism were
limited (possibly refined by the development of tendencies to cooperative child
care, but nonetheless limited). Because of the limits, social stability required
prolonged peace-keeping. Because of the frequent failures to respond altruisti-
cally, and because of the time invested in peace-keeping, cooperative ventures
were less extensive than they would eventually become (in post-ethical Homo).
And that reduced ability to cooperate lies behind the large budget of problems
to which Braddock and Rosenberg gesture. Hence, the essential parts of the
analytical history stand, although I should recognize that some of the ideas fa-
vored by Braddock and Rosenberg point to possibilities of providing different
`how possibly' explanations (since those are quite candidly labeled as not forced
by the evidence, plurality here is welcome).
In his thoughtful and wide-ranging essay, Allen Buchanan makes a smaller
point about the analytical history I propose, claiming that there is good reason to
think that the societies in which the ethical project first emerged were gender-
inegalitarian, and some grounds for doubting their commitments to equality
among males. To say the least, the sources he cites on gender inequality have
been controversial, particularly when the societies under consideration are taken
as representative of the ancestral condition. As EP makes clear, my ideas about
the egalitarianism of early societies are dependent on three different anthropolog-
ical studies: a pioneering essay by Knauft, Christoph Boehm's detailed investi-
gations of hierarchy, and the wide-ranging research conducted on the !Kung (ar-
guably one of the very best living models for the lives of our ancestors) (Knauft
1991; Boehm 1999; Lee 1979). I am impressed not only by Richard Lee's thor-
ough documentation of the elaborate strategies used by the !Kung to maintain
equality, but also by ethnographic accounts of the lives of !Kung women (for
example, Marjorie Shostak's Nisa). These studies are reinforced by my account
of the emergence of cooperative societies (see particularly 9 of EP), in which I
argue that the habitat would be divided among different large coalitions (social
groups of the order of 80 members) in which the members would need to unite
to resist predations from rival bands. So I am not moved by Buchanan's doubts.
Michael Baurmann presents a wide-ranging critique of the analytical history
I offer, some of which I take to be vitiated by a mischaracterization of important
features of my account, but part of which offers a valuable insight. I start with
the points of disagreement, before focusing more closely on the serious challenge
he poses.
Baurmann's initial description of collective decision-making is unfortunate,
at least as an account of the ancestors who began the ethical project. As EP is
as some pains to note, the ethical pioneers could not have framed the issues as
later analysts dothey could simply not have known what Baurmann supposes
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me to think they knew (see EP, 2212, for example). The Deweyan conception
behind EP is of ethics as a deep response to problems posed by the `conditions of
human life', in which progress is occasionally made, but typically made blindly.
The analytic hope is that by understanding what has been going on, we can learn
how to proceed more systematically and more reliably (see my further response
to Baurmann in the final section below).
Baurmann is dubious about the idea of Paleolithic human beings sitting
around the campfire in the cool hour, figuring out the rules that are to govern
their lives together. A significant part of my contrary belief that this is a plau-
sible scenario for the earliest ethical ventures stems from the records of ethno-
graphers who describe similar things in the lives of hunter-gatherer societies.
Once you strip away the kinds of advanced understanding and self-awareness
that Baurmann wrongly assumes to be part of my picture, the conversations I
envisage are well-supported by the evidence.
Nor should we replace my characterization of the problem with the one Bau-
rmann seems to prefer, in which rules come in to address difficulties in coordi-
nation or weaknesses of commitment. Here, I think, he is reading my concept
of altruism-failure in the same narrow way favored by Braddock and Rosenberg.
To repeat: the root difficulty, when coordination fails or when commitments are
not followed through, is typically a lack of responsiveness to othersjust what
I count as an altruism-failure. Perhaps I should have explained that altruism-
failure is generic in ways that the surrogates proposed by some of my critics are
not.
I thoroughly agree with Baurmann's thought that hierarchies emerge when
social groups are `on the path to growth'indeed this is part of the story of EP,
1920. I follow prominent anthropologists in thinking that inequality increases
in the very late Paleolithic, as animals are domesticated and societies become
larger. So, on my account, a more lengthy period in which the ethical project
was conducted on terms of equality gave way to a shorter time interval (of the
order of ten thousand years) in which the initial form of the project was changed.
Changed, moreover, in ways that affected the ability to respond to the problem
of remedying altruism failures, the problem that began it all. (As I suggest in
the final section below, this can easily be viewed as a distortion of the project.)
Now to Baurmann's important insight. At the heart of his essay is a complaint
that my thoughts about the early stages of normative guidance are too simple.
To caricature my views: the first ethicists perceive that certain types of behavior
regularly cause trouble; that perception inhibits some individual impulses to
action, and also issues in a collective decision to announce that those forms of
behavior will be punished. If I read Baurmann aright, he thinks that a lot of
social work has to be done before people can get to that collective decision. Was
it possible for the groups I envisage to carry out that work?
That seems to me to be a very good question. I am inclined to think that the
possibility of discussion rests on the two sides of the human condition to which
I point. Our ancestors were able to sit down together and discuss the problem
(once they had language, of course!) because they were limited altruists; the
problem was there to be discussed because they were limited altruists. Even
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before they developed `rules of recognition' and other advanced bits of machinery,
there were some contexts in which they could talk together about past difficulties
in their social lives. My extensive discussion of altruism and its dimensions is
intended to pave the way for drawing this conclusion.
It is worth juxtaposing Baurmann's complaint with the suggestion of Brad-
dock and Rosenberg to the effect that my starting point for the ethical project
takes pre-ethical social life to be much closer to the lives of chimpanzee troops
than it actually was. In essence both criticisms chide me for telling too simple
a story about the arrival of normative guidance. In both cases, that general
complaint is probably correct. I contend, however, that, while various kinds
of non-verbally-mediated coordination and possibly further refinements of psy-
chological altruism come into play before the ethical project gets started, these
only make small advances on the generic problem of altruism failure. Our cur-
rent inabilities to respond to the needs of others in cases where there are not
well-established norms is surely a reminder of how narrowly limited was the al-
truism that pervaded pre-ethical societies. I agree with Braddock, Rosenberg,
and Baurmann that a more complex account of the emergence of socially em-
bedded normative guidance needs to be given, an account that allows for further
evolution of cooperative tendencies and one that appreciates the conditions that
need to be in place for the conversations around the campfire I envisage. What
I have attempted to do here is sketch some reasons for thinking that the im-
proved account would not subvert the parts of the history I need for drawing my
philosophical conclusions.
I turn now to the masterpiece of chiaroscuro painted by my old friend Kim
Sterelny (confession: although I might have guessed that Kim had an inner
Marx, ready to be channeled, who would have suspected an inner Nietzsche?).
To put Sterelny's view in its simplest terms, the explicit rules whose origins I
hope to trace have been, on the whole, a thoroughly bad thing; the good stuff
stems from the flowering of the sympathetic emotions. I go astray in telling a
Kantian story of the evolution of ethics; Sterelny prefers to throw in his lot with
Hume and Smith.
Interestingly, the overlap in sources between Sterelny and me is very large,
even though the `sunny' story about morality he attributes to me, and the `dark'
one he relates are radically different. How can this be?
Part of the answer lies in the fact that this really is chiaroscuro, while EP
uses an extensive color palette. Sterelny wants a sharp opposition, and, to this
end, he `constructs my views' by ignoring all sorts of qualifying discussions.
Many ethicists would find his comment that my account is too Kantian quite
perplexing (indeed, Buchanan insightfully asks whether I have given sufficient
place to ethical reasoningsee section 4 below). Moreover, Sterelny seems not
to have taken seriously my attempt in EP 11 not to take sides in the debate
between Rationalists and Sentimentalists (between Kant and Hume/Smith) but
to transcend it. That section denied the existence of any special `moral point of
view', and suggested that it is a mark of well-crafted ethical traditions that they
deploy a wide variety of forms of ethical motivation (our entangled psychologies
are well-buffered systems). It would have been better if I had not talked so
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much about rules in giving my account of the ethical projectI do mention
the importance of stories that provide exemplars of conduct, and that often
shape our emotions, but, for all the significance of stories and ideals, it is easier
to focus on the simpler machinery of explicit precepts and rules. Perhaps my
simplifications misled Sterelny; if so, they will surely mislead others.
A more important part of the answer is that I do not claim that the ethical
project, in the forms it has taken, is something worthy of celebration through
and through. From early in the discussion of normative guidance (EP, 945),
it is made completely clear that the project can `warp' socialized individuals.
Many of the developments of the project are seen as mixed in character. So,
for example, invoking a deity solved some problems while manufacturing many
others (compare 17; 26; 27), and attempts to satisfy endorsable desires led
to the abandonment of the commitment to equality (1920; 367). I had
thought that echoes of Rousseau and Marx would have been impossible to miss
in these discussionsbut I should probably have been more emphatic about
those connections.
With these preliminary explanations, Sterelny's chiaroscuro can be compared
with the picture I actually painted. On his account the sympathetic emotions,
forged through cooperative foraging, are key to the flowering of human societies;
normative guidance comes late, and typically gets in the way. On his version
of my story, the sympathetic emotions are weak, and cooperation flourishes
solely because groups are able to reason their way to norms and procedures for
enforcing them. My actual narrative does not suppose that norms are introduced
by clear-headed reasoners (Sterelny offers the same overinterpretation here as
Michael Baurmanna fact that suggests to me that the first paragraphs of
EP, 14 should already have introduced the points made at 2212). Further,
it envisages a sequence of interactions between explicitly adopted norms and
stories and the development of our sympathetic emotions (EP, 815; 1347).
Sterelny's chiaroscuro misses this important part of my narrative. On his
account, I find no place for collective intentions. To the contrary, I am happy
to include them in the evolution of ethical practice, and even devoted a section
to the expansion of altruism (EP, 21). So I am happy to celebrate Kim and
Melanie's walk up the hilland to view it as an instance of higher-order altruism.
Perhaps that walk was prefigured in some occasions of chimpanzee joint foraging,
but I am inclined to think that Kim and Melanie bring to their co-peregrinations
a reflective perspective that depends on a capacity for normative guidance.
My analytical history supposes that the emotional capacities available to hu-
man beings evolved through both practice in cooperative behavior and norma-
tively-guided reflections on that practice. Our ancestors started with limited
capacities for cooperation. By solving a few problems of altruism failure, they
began to cooperate a bit more. Increased cooperation expanded their emotional
repertoire, and normative reflections on what they had achieved (and the prob-
lems still facing them) led them to introduce more rules and stories. The new
rules and stories induced further cooperation and developed the sympathetic
emotions further. So far, a happy account of increasing regularity in social be-
havior and more intense social sympathies. Yet, as EP is at pains to recognize,
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as human societies grew (and the growth was made possible by the virtuous
cycles of expansion just noted), some of the rules and stories interfered with the
prosocial tendencies, creating divisions and focusing sympathy more parochially.
The normative stance of chapters 8 and 9 is a direct response to the darker parts
of this history, to the ways in which the virtuous cycles have been compromised
and distorted.
Sterelny concludes by conceding that his picture is probably too dark. I
suspect that, as with so many debates about human behavior (recall `genetic
determinism' versus `social determinism'), the sensible views concern the relative
contribution of factors that extreme views identify as all-powerful. EP was less
extreme, and more sensible, than Sterelny portrays it as being. In the end, our
disagreement is probably one about the weight to be assigned to different kinds
of causes in episodes in which human social life was modified. I hope my remarks
here provide a basis for continuing our conversation.
Let me turn now to the more systematic concerns about the framework of
my analytical history. My goal was to specify the psychological capacities and
the social conditions that were required for the emergence of human ethical life,
and then to trace paths that connect primitive ethical practices with the ethics
of the present (identifying actual processes where I can, and, in other instances,
showing how connections might have occurred). The concept of psychological
altruism is central to my treatment of psychological capacities, and some of my
critics have challenged my treatment of it.
The principal disagreements between Buchanan and me all stem, I believe,
from a difference about the characterization of psychological altruism. He writes:
The notion of being responsive to the desires of others here is sus-
ceptible of a stronger and weaker interpretation: on the stronger
interpretation it means that each gives equal weight to the desires
of all affected in a particular interaction, including his own; on the
weaker interpretation a psychological altruist is someone who gives
weight to the desires of all, but not necessarily equal weight. (this
issue, 82)
This introduces a dichotomy, where I see a multi-dimensional continuum of forms
of altruism. The root notion is that of A being altruistic towards B in context C,
and my account explicitly distinguishes the intensity of the response (how much
weight A gives to the desires attributed to B), the range of altruism (which in-
dividuals elicit any altruistic response), and the scope of altruism (the contexts
in which A responds altruistically). Even before considering the complications
of paternalistic altruism and higher-order altruism, there's a three-dimensional
space in which individuals possess altruism profiles. Buchanan's two types of
altruism, the ones between which I'm supposed to be undecided, are two very
particular profiles drawn from this vast space. The root notion of an altru-
ism failure is that of some failure of responsiveness, and the task of the ethical
project is to promote greater responsiveness by singling out which altruism pro-
files should be encouraged. That might lead to privileging one of the special
profiles Buchanan considers, but there is no advance reason for supposing that.
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Because the potential resources for responding to generic altruism failure are so
much larger, developments of the ethical project can be enormously richer than
the options to which Buchanan takes me to be limited. As we'll see in later
sections, this basic disagreement about altruism lies behind our diverging views
about whether my account can meet the important challenges he poses.
Christine Clavien also questions my treatment of altruism (not only in its
psychological forms), but ours is more of a family quarrel. I completely agree
with her that two different notions of biological altruism can be found in the evo-
lutionary literature: a strong one that demands that the losses for the altruistic
agent must endure, and a weaker conception (perhaps now less common) that
allows for Trivers' reciprocal altruism. EP should have been clear on this point.
She is also correct to emphasize the various notions of behavioral altruism that
seem to be at play in experimental economics, and to recognize the difficulties of
deciding whether to attribute psychological altruism in many human behavioral
contexts. Precisely this difficulty led me to defend the possibility of psychological
altruism by citing non-human examples where some of the complicating factors
are absent.
The most radical challenge to the framework in which I develop my history
comes in Ken Binmore's essay. Binmore is not only one of the most distinguished
game theorists of our times, but rightly esteemed for his extensive attempts to
apply game-theoretic ideas to the study of human social interactions. If I read his
essay correctly, he regrets the fact that EP doesn't pursue a project more akin
to his own (similar regrets can also be found in the complaints of Braddock and
Rosenberg, and O'Connor et al. that I have slighted non-linguistic coordination
of behavior). At an early stage of developing my ideas, I assumed that the
right approach would be along similar lines to those pursued by Binmore and
by Brian Skyrms.1 I allude to my departure from this general program in the
acknowledgments section of EP, but perhaps I should have explained my reasons
more extensively.
Binmore distrusts my emphasis on psychological altruism (which he labels
`emotional altruism'), taking me to regard this as central to moral motivation.
This last attribution is a mistake, since 1113 are quite explicit about the di-
versity of the ways in which people are morally moved. I emphasize psychological
altruism because I take it to be a precondition of the type of sociality that sets
the problem for ethics to solve. Because they were limited altruists our ances-
tors could live together in small groups mixed by age and sex; because they were
limited altruists, they were unable to do so easily. Hence, the starting point
for my inquiries has to be that of saying what psychological altruism means,
providing grounds for thinking that human beings and some of our evolutionary
relatives are capable of it, and quelling doubts that psychological altruism could
not originate and be maintained under natural selection.
That is where the game theory comes inand the only place it needs to
come in. Once human beings have the capacities to start the ethical project, the
1 I first met Ken Binmore when I was in transition. He served as commentator for a lecture
I gave in London, in which I was struggling to develop some of the ideas of the early parts of
EP. I am grateful to him for his extremely constructive suggestions on that occasion.
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evolutionary dynamics are not only more complicated, but also more permissive
of a wide variety of options. The Folk Theorem I need is the one I cite from
Boyd and Richerson: Punishment allows the evolution of cooperation (or any-
thing else) in sizable groups (EP, 87 n. 22). Since (recall!) my task is to trace
a path, not to identify the selection processes that took us down that path,
what's required is some assurance that the hypothetical path accords with the
evolutionary constraints. The Boyd-Richerson theorem delivers just that.
But the game theory I construct is quite different from Binmore's. His agents
are rational egoists who engage in repeated interactions. Part of my story about
the evolution of psychological altruism depends on showing how certain types
of interactionsoptional games (in which players can choose partners, and even
whether to play at all)might come about in the first place. Behind the Pris-
oner's Dilemma (and all its sisters and its cousins and its aunts) lies a more basic
explanandumhow did groups of primates become able to live in the same places
at the same times and thus set the stage for repeated interactions? In 9 of EP,
I suggest that our remote primate ancestors were forced into playing a complex
game, the Coalition Game, in which large coalitions, with subcoalitions, emerged
to divide the habitat. Because the Coalition Game is intractable, there's no rea-
son to think that even the cleverest rational agents will do better at it than
psychological altruistsperhaps there are even reasons for thinking they will do
worse.
So I can now sum up the principal differences between Binmore and me. He
wants to explain the emergence of coordinated behavior, that might eventually
be captured by explicit rules, through giving analyses in standard game the-
ory. I want to explain the emergence of psychological altruism, seen both as the
precondition of a certain type of sociality and (because of its limits) as setting
the problem for the ethical project; I do so, by extending the altruistic tenden-
cies towards young and towards kin, through the demands of a mathematically
intractable ur-game, the Coalition Game.2 Once coalitions are in place, the
payoffs in interactions are modified both by (limited) altruistic adjustments and
by the coalition structure within the society (you have to keep your friends).
The crucial explanatory task is to explain how one might have come from a pre-
ethical state of this general form to the complex ethical life we now have. That
requires tracing a path compatible with the evolutionary constraints, but it does
not require identifying the mechanisms of selection. Hence, at this stage, evolu-
tionary game theory drops out of the picture, in favor of an understanding of
how normative guidance might have originated and might have been extended.
If what you want to explain is the history of ethicsas opposed to `nice
behavior' or coordinated actionthen it seems to me that my framework is
preferable. Part of the reason for that is that it focuses on the linguistic devices
that are the expressions of reflective ethical life. Another part is that it accords
better with the data available from primatology, archeology, and anthropology.
My original defection from standard game-theoretic approaches was prompted
2 I suppose that recognizing this game is important for understanding the different forms of
societies found among the Great Apes. Sterelny's charge that it is irrelevant to the evolution
of `hominin social worlds' seems not to understand the role I assign to the Coalition Game.
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by recognizing how difficult it is to square the agents of game theory with the
animals of the present (and the past).
3. Objections to the Meta-Ethics
I divide the critique of my `Meta-Ethical Perspective' into four main parts. First
come challenges to my approach to ethical progress, focused on claims about
functions for the ethical project. Next are claims that I err in thinking that my
analytical history undermines more traditional approaches to truth and progress
in ethics. The third type of objection complains that I have failed to provide an
explanation of ethical progress. Finally, there are doubts about whether I am
entitled to talk of ethical truth.
Mantzavinos (or his `student') charges that the notion of function is `crypto-
normative'. Although appeal to a concept that conceals its normative character
is supposed to be `the main trick' of my approach, the complaint is not elaborated
at any length (indeed, `student' seems then to head off in a rather different
direction). Nevertheless, this type of criticism is an instance of an important
family: naturalists can easily be cast as conjurers who pull normative rabbits
out of descriptive hats, inviting their opponents to identify the exact way in
which the rabbit was inserted in the first place. So it is worth my being explicit
about why I take the objection to be mistaken.
On my account, functions are grounded in problems (more exactly, problem
backgrounds: EP, 21821). It is tempting to think that a problem arises for
a person when that person has desires that cannot be satisfied as things cur-
rently stand (or perhaps, goals that cannot be achieved under the present state
of affairs). Viewed in this way, the approach would appear to veer towards a
subjective notion of progress, of the sort that chapter 5 of EP opposes. That
worry is explicitly addressed in 39 of EP, where I suggest that problem back-
grounds (of the type with which I am concerned) have both a subjective and
an objective side. The tensions of chimp-hominid societies do interfere with the
aspirations of the members of those societies (subjective side), but they would
interfere with the aspirations of almost any hominid or human being placed in
those conditionsin other words, there are features of the situation itself, inde-
pendent of the various idiosyncratic desires of the affected people, that threaten
satisfying whatever desires those people may have (objective side). The reference
here to `almost all people' is important, for there might be a few exceptional in-
dividuals whose desires would not conform to this regularity. Imperfect though
the generalization probably is, it holds widely enough to support Dewey's pro-
posal (the epigraph of EP) that [m]oral conceptions and processes grow out of
the very conditions of human life.
It is now possible to see why Mantzavinos thinks the notion of function is
`crypto-normative'. The conditions of chimp-hominid society are problematic for
almost all human beingsor, as we might better say, for normal human beings.
People who were unaffected by living in such a fragile and unreliable society
would be abnormal, lacking a particular type of sensitivity, in the ways that
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some severely autistic children are abnormal, in the ways that the color blind
or the deaf are abnormal, in the ways that sufferers from type 1 diabetes are
abnormal, and so forth. There are many species of normative concepts, and, if
we choose, we can think of problem background and function as belonging to the
genus. Yet it would be quite wrong to think that this unmasks a `trick'for, even
though a rabbit may be pulled out of the hat, what has been shown to be inserted
at the beginning isn't a rabbit but something interestingly different. The kind
of normativity that emerges is not the `normativity' of the notion of function.
More significantly, whether or not the concepts problem background and function
count as normative, they can be applied through processes of observation and
reasoning we readily understand. Nobody thinks there is any great mystery in
gaining evidence for the conclusion that normal human beings have 23 pairs of
chromosomes (even though some unfortunate people do not), or the conclusion
that normal human beings can do things that severely autistic children cannot,
or any of a host of similar conclusions.3 Because whatever normativity my key
concepts have proves epistemologically unproblematic, we achieve a naturalistic
account of ethical progress, one that solves one of the principal difficulties of
meta-ethics. Once that point is appreciated, whether or not you apply the label
`crypto-normative' doesn't matter.
The clarifications I have tried to make help address a second worry about
my use of the concept of function, one present in the essays of Clavien and of
Braddock and Rosenberg, but most fully articulated by Buchanan. Buchanan
sees me as making a serious equivocation between two attributions of the original
function of ethics.
According to the first, avoiding social costs is the ultimate function,
and remedying altruism failure is a function only so far as it con-
tributes to that; according to the second, the ultimate function is to
remedy altruism failures, regardless of whether doing so is the best
way to avoid their social costs. (this issue, 82)
He is fully aware of my use of a medical analogy, recognizing that I think of the
social tensions as symptoms of an underlying disease (a widespread tendency
to altruism failure), but, supposedly, my commitment to a particular type of
altruism (one of the altruism profiles Buchanan selectssee section 2 above)
commits me to a moralized understanding of what it is to remedy altruism
failures (this issue, 84).
This is a very important objection, for Buchanan is claiming to find a real
rabbit placed in the hat at the outset. I think his argument goes astray because
he modifies my approach to altruism and thus misses my concept of altruism
failure. It's worth taking this slowly.
To say that a widespread tendency to altruism failure is part of the fabric of
chimp-hominid society, or, equally, of Dewey's `very conditions of human life', is
3 Here there is a point of kinship between the approach originated by Philippa Foot in her
Natural Goodness (and developed further by a number of philosophers influenced by her). Of
course, there are many substantial differences between my account and Foot's, most of them
stemming from my preference for post-Darwinian biology over Aristotle's.
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to recognize two things: first, that dispositions to psychological altruism made
living together in small groups mixed by age and sex possible for our ancestors;
second that the limits to those dispositions gave rise to frequent failures to
respond to the aspirations and emotions of others, and consequent frustration of
human desires. Experiencing those frustrations is akin to feeling the pain caused
by some underlying structural condition. Because the effects of that underlying
condition are so pervasive, extending across a vast range of possible projects and
aspirations and arising with such frequency, the problem has to be attended to
at its source. Like many parasitic infections, it has to be dealt with by dealing
with the underlying cause.
This underlying cause is not identified as our lack of some specific altruism
profilesay the one that Buchanan attributes to me as the remedy for altruism
failure. Rather, the source of the trouble is the fact that our evolved dispositions
to psychological altruism are so limited. The ethical project finds its original
function in a response to that fact, and the form of that response is not set in
advance as some commitment to equal responsiveness to the desires of all. I ar-
gue that, as a matter of empirical fact, the conditions of Paleolithic human life,
made it impossible to solve the problem posed by our limited altruism without
attending to the wishes and aspirations of all members of the band. So, on my
account, the problem of altruism failure consists in widespread tendencies not
to respond to the wishes of others, and the solution to that problem had to
be worked out through negotiations among group members (through identifying
some desires as endorsable and others as contaminated: EP, 2235). But, be-
cause the group members need one another, because altruism failures can arise
within any subset with two or more members, and because of the frequency
with which limited altruism is overridden, all members have to be considered.
Because of his misinterpretation of my concept of altruism, Buchanan has been
led to inflate my notion of altruism failure, and thus to make an illicit conflation
of things that are conceptually separate. Properly understood, my notion of
altruism failure is not already moralized. Once again: no rabbit.
Several commentators believe that the analytical history is not as inhospitable
to traditional accounts of ethical truth as I take it to be. Mantzavinos, for
example, thinks that some version of non-cognitivism can survive the challenges
posed in EP chapter 5. For non-cognitivism to succeed, however, would require
an account of progress for the emotions taken to be expressedan account of
what is meant by saying that the emotions elicited at later stages are more
`apt' than those appearing at earlier times. Despite my admiration for Allan
Gibbard's work, I cannot find any such account in his writings, nor in those of
any other non-cognitivist I know. So, if the challenge is to be met, some serious
work will have to be done.
The defense of a more traditional picture of ethical truth is most cogently
articulated by William Rottschaefer, who has done a lot of serious work in trying
to find a version of moral realism compatible with the evolution of ethics. I ap-
plaud Rottschaefer's detailed account of how psychological capacities we actually
have might put us in touch with the moral facts realists want to invoke, and I
am grateful for his sympathetic attempt to forge connections between his moral
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realism and my pragmatic naturalism. In the end, however, I want to stick with
the unvarnished pragmatic naturalism of EP, without realist additives. Perhaps
I am missing something in the details of Rottschaefer's moral realism, but I think
there is a crucial lacuna in the story.
Start with the debate between Harman and Sturgeon (Sturgeon 1985; Har-
man 1986). Sturgeon claimed, ambitiously, that people can sometimes see the
wrongness of an actionas when onlookers respond to the torturing of a cat
by judging that the action is wrong. For Harman, and for me, the judgment
is socially mediated: precisely because the onlookers have been educated in the
mores of their societies, they apply the predicate `wrong' without hesitation. For
Sturgeon to defend his supposed epistemological connection to moral reality, he
would have to explore the phylogeny of the social practiceto show that the
categories and applications of them that now come so fluently grew out of some
prior detection of the moral facts. So I disagree with Rottschaefer about the
outcome of the debate. Moral realism has a very specific task to discharge. It
must show how there is a history behind our current social practices, one that
is like the history behind current usages of the scientific instruments we take for
granted. The argument of chapter 5 of EP is not only that nobody has demon-
strated the pertinent sort of history, but that features of my analytical history
undermine the possibility.
Rottschaefer's story of Sonia focuses on ontogeny, rather than phylogeny.
And that is important, because the sorts of processes to which he points in the
moral growth of children already presuppose the social backdrop whose status
with respect to the apprehension of moral reality is at issue. No doubt, given
the prevalent ideas of her community, Sonia can learn how to apply the moral
concepts as others do, in just the kinds of ways Rottschaefer suggests she does.
All that can happen whether or not the community's lore tracks moral reality.
Rottschaefer and I both emphasize empathic capacities, although we give
them rather different roles. I agree with him that perception of particular situa-
tions might excite our feelings in ways that move us to particular types of action.
I can even concur in the thought that those situations provide affordances for
certain types of actions. The worry is that, unless some ethical framework is
already presupposed, there is no basis for applying any ethical category to those
actions. Moral realists underrate the difficulties of those who make innovations.
Even supposing Woolman (or some other revisionary) felt empathy for the suf-
ferings of a black slave, it is not clear how the judgment that the response is a
moral advance is to be justified. The emotion does not come with its progressive
moral character clearly labeled. On my account, ethics is the product of collec-
tive human deliberation about the problems we face in living together, and it
is not hard to appreciate how an empathetic response can be the starting point
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for renewed conversation.4 What I do not see is how moral realism can supply
more justification than that.
The version of moral realism offered by Rottschaefer adds further details to
the simplified set of resources for justification I have considered, but, so far as
I can see, the elaboration does not close the crucial lacuna. What is required is
an account of moral reality that shows how the processes taken to disclose it can
put us in touch with its features. As we learn more about the physical world, we
can explain how we are able to detect some of its aspects, both through unaided
observation and by means of the instruments we design and build. The root
trouble is that there's nothing parallel to that for the moral realist to rely on.
Moral reality is simply so under-described that it is quite mysterious how (say)
empathetic reactions to other people could put us in touch with it.
My response to Braddock and Rosenberg's suggestion that the situation is
no worse in ethics than in other areas of knowledge is simply to deny that
our predicament in other instances is so dire. Various types of knowledge may
be difficult for us, but, on any moral realist account I know, it appears that
moral deliberation is simply cut off from the supposed moral reality. I would
draw similar conclusions about any area in which the alleged subject matter
could not be apprehended by beings with the kinds of capacities people have.
One response to this predicament is to inflate our cognitive resourceshence
the popularity of appeals to `intuition' in ethics and other instances. I prefer
Rottschaefer's admirably honest attempt to show how the abilities we actually
have deliver the ethical goods, even though I doubt that they can actually detect
any external ethical reality.5
Turn now to the third line of opposition to my meta-ethical perspective,
Buchanan's suggestion that, at the end of the day, I have failed to explain ethical
progress. He is completely correct when he claims that I have not explained how
progressive `transitions come about'. With respect to some episodes I offer a
partial account of what the innovators did (as, for example, in my discussions of
Woolman and Wollstonecraft), but it would be sheer folly to attempt any serious
explanatory narrative for the transitions that occurred in the remote past. With
respect to those, I can only sketch a how-possibly story, indicating one way in
which things might have gone (as I do, for example, in sections of EP, chapter
3).
Does this vitiate my account of progress? No.There are two different explana-
tory tasks. The first is to explain what ethical progress consists in. The second
is to explain how human beings come (when they do) to make ethical progress.
All that needs to be done with respect to the second, for my purposes at least,
4 As EP notes, Woolman, like other revolutionaries, would have known that large numbers
of apparently knowledgeable and pious members of his society did not think that black suffering
mattered morally. Unlike the figures envisaged by moral realists, he recognized the need to
engage the complex web of arguments invoked to defend the idea that the suffering of slaves
was not morally significant.
5 I think mathematics poses similar troubles for realism. In this instance, I try to supply
a non-realist account of mathematical statements, so as to show how the processes undergone
by mathematicians during the historical evolution of mathematics can actually deliver justifi-
cations. See `Mathematical Truth?', in my forthcoming collection Preludes to Pragmatism.
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is to rebut doubts that the concept of progress I deploy makes ethical progress
impossible or incomprehensibleand that task is discharged by the discussions
of the actual contributions made by Wollstonecraft and Woolman (EP, 24951)
and the presentations of possibilities of EP, 1921. The crucial question for
my approach to ethics is the first. That is the topic of EP, chapter 6, and
the question can be completely addressed without venturing into the territory
Buchanan views me as neglecting.
Finally, Braddock and Rosenberg raise an interesting objection to my at-
tempt to defend the thesis that some ethical statements are true (according to
my pragmatist conception of ethical truth). I take an ethical statement to be
true just in case it would be adopted in a progressive transition and retained un-
der an indefinite sequence of future progressive transitions (for a slightly more
exact version, see EP, 246). As Braddock and Rosenberg see, the grounding
of the notion of progress in problems to be overcome seems to introduce an
environment-relativity. If the environment changes sufficiently dramatically, will
ethical statements that were `once true' cease to be so? Or should we say that,
because there are environments in which the problems go away, that such state-
ments were never true? And if we do say that, will there turn out to be any
ethical truths?
The best way to come to terms with this worry is to consider my central
example of ethical truth, the case of honesty. I claim (EP 46) that a vague
generalization to the effect that truth-telling is good and lying bad was intro-
duced progressively and is likely to endure through a sequence of progressive
transitions. How can I be so confident about the future, and about the environ-
ments in which human beings will find themselves? In fact, I am making some
assumptions about those environments: I am taking it for granted that people
will continue to live together, to exchange information with one another, and
that they will continue to need information from others if they are to realize
the goals that matter to them. I would regard these as part of Dewey's `condi-
tions of human life'. If our species were ever to be freed from them, the ethical
project would have come to an endfor fully self-sufficient angels there is no
such project. To support the attribution of truth to the vague generalization
about honesty, what is required is to show that, so long as the ethical project
continues, progressive transitions would retain something like the judgment that
truth-telling is good and lying bad. So long as the project continues, truthful
testimony from others will tend to promote the satisfaction of the recipient's
desires. Refusal to tell the truth and deliberate lying will thus be a general type
of altruism failure, so that maintaining the generalization (and its associated
rule) will fulfill the original function of ethics. If I am right in thinking that
the original function will continue to be important in human life (EP, 56), the
generalization (or something akin to it) will endure in progressive transitions.
Hence, on my account of truth, it can be hailed as true.
Of course, one instance, even an important one, does not settle the general
worry presented by Braddock and Rosenberg. Perhaps it will turn out that
possible environmental variations doom the ascription of truth to some of our
common ethical maxims (`mother's best advice'). That remains to be seen. In
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the meantime, the objection is valuable in showing how deeply my approach to
ethics conceives of it as a human projectone resulting from the fundamental
conditions of human life.
4. Normative Issues
The material of the final third of the book elicits less attention from my com-
mentators, most probably because they think enough mistakes have been made
earlier to undercut the treatment of the last three chapters. Zed Adams is an
exception, however. His principal concerns about my picture focus on the pos-
sibility of a naturalistic fallacy (see section 5 ), and on my claim that there are
no ethical experts. My present concern will be with this latter issue.
Adams asks a good question: why, if ethics is a social technology, aren't there
ethical experts? Part of the answer to this is to acknowledge that, when there is
some function (or functions) that can be identified, when there is a recognizable
defect in discharging the function(s), and when there are ways to remedy the
defect without compromising other functions, the problem is one that can be
addressed completely by anyone with the ability to find an appropriate means
(or to discover the best means). So, for some kinds of ethical advances, there are
experts, and they play just the role that experts do in other areas of technology.
What makes ethical life, and ethical discussion, hard is the existence of func-
tional conflict. Adams recognizes this, I think, when he suggests that our most
difficult ethical question is figuring what, if anything, has become of the func-
tion of ethics (this issue, 164). I agree with his conclusion that my genealogy
is `incomplete'and that is prefigured in the problem that emerges at the end
of Part II of EP, and which occupies the first two chapters of Part III. I would
put it slightly differently: a continuation of the ethical project requires sorting
out how to go on when functions conflict, but I can see how that might involve
coming to decide `what the ethical project has made of us'.
The Normative Stance of Part III proposes that individuals, however well-
informed they may be, can only make proposals about the weights to be assigned
to different functions. The actual assignment of weights depends on a collective
decision. Even with respect to the proper making of the decision, individuals
can only contribute procedural proposals. Just as there are no religious experts
in ethicsfor there is no source to which such people might have accessthere
are no philosophical experts either. A consequence of my genealogy (even if
incomplete!) and of the meta-ethics I draw from it, is that there is no source
of ethical truth outside the decisions of the community that pursues the ethical
project. Chapters 8 and 9 of EP present two proposals, one about the conception
of the good that might guide us at the present stage of our evolution, and one
about the community of discussants and the form of their conversation. By
endeavoring to show that these proposals mutually cohere, I try to rebut a
certain type of skeptical challenge (for more on this, see the next section).
Part III reduces the role and the claims of philosophy, but it continues to
recognize the value of philosophy in continuing the ethical project. Although
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I deny a certain type of philosophical expertise, I affirm another. Because the
decision for how to go on must be collective, no philosopher, however learned,
wise, and virtuous, has the authority to pre-empt the collective discussion. On
the other hand, people who have grappled with the systematic approaches that
have been offered in the history of ethical theorizing, people who have tried
to think through hard problems and to introduce and refine distinctions and
concepts, people who have a broad sense of the possibilities of human living
and of the extent to which those are often compromised, might have bodies of
knowledge and intellectual and empathetic skills that are valuable in facilitating
ethical conversation. When experts are conceived as people who have abilities
that make them useful in advancing a collective project, it's even possible to
agree with Adams' suggested answer to his question: in a sense, there are ethical
experts (philosophers among them). It is important, however, not to confuse this
sort of expertise with the stronger idea of special people who can discoverall
by themselvesthe Ethical Truth.
Buchanan closes his penetrating critique with a discussion of the `cosmopoli-
tan' approach of my normative stance. In my judgment, his label is entirely apt.
What puzzles him is the way that a project originally founded in the remedying
of altruism failures can be extended in the ways I suggest. Part of the expla-
nation of his perplexity lies in his misidentification of the original function: to
repeat, that function consists in the remedying of altruism failures, where these
are conceived, not as the absence of some specific altruism profile, but as a gen-
eral tendency not to respond to the aspirations of others. Altruism failures were
originally problematic within small groups, and the failures addressed through
the early phases of the ethical project were those affecting group members. We
live in a world of dramatically enlarged causal dependencies, and a central pro-
posal of Part III is that this demands a wider notion of responsiveness. The
ideal conversation has to involve all of us (including our descendants).
Yet I think there is a deep insight in Buchanan's approach throughout his
essay, one that discloses a significant omission in EP. The focus on collective
decision and conversation gives rise to a notion of ideal conversation, in Part III,
that fails to incorporate dimensions of actual discussions, aspects that surely
emerged at some point in the evolution of the ethical project. Perhaps early on,
our ancestors voiced their discontents and suggestions, but, as a body of maxims
and paradigms of conduct accumulated, they would surely have thought about
how new ideas might fit within the framework they already had, how potential
solutions of new problems might be defended or rebutted. The conversations
envisaged in EP do not explicitly portray the collective decision-making in this
way: the discussants are not shown as reasoning with one another. In my zeal to
portray ethics as a human social practice, ethical theorizing is held at a distance.
As I read him, Buchanan identifies this as a defect of my approach in EP (see,
in particular, his comment that I neglect the role of moral reasoning in moral
progress), and here I take him to be correct. Besides the conditions chapter 9
imposes on ideal conversation, there should also be requirements on reasoning.
The set of cognitive constraints (EP, 3445) should thus be extended, to include
conditions that specify when attempts at justification need to be undertaken,
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and what features justifications should have or should lack. The method outlined
in chapter 9 can be further developed along these lines, and, so far as I can see,
that further development would strengthen the Normative Stance I propose.
5. The Inevitable Question
We come at last to the issue I expect to emerge, not only in discussions of
my own version of naturalism, but in reactions to any attempt to work out a
naturalistic program for ethics. One of my fellow naturalists, Richard Joyce, has
offered an excellent treatment of the diversity of the charges that naturalists fall
into fallacy, and I dedicated an entire chapter to responding to some important
variants (Joyce 2006). Nor was my work over at the end of that chapter, because
a particularly challenging mutant remained to be tackled only in 56. But the
worry will not go away. It recurs (gently!) in Clavien's essay, and underlies some
of Buchanan's worries. It is developed by Adams in a different form, and it is
the central theme of the critique of O'Connor et al. As I'll try to explain, my
response grows out of the thought that we can learn from historybut precisely
because I am an avid fan of that thought, I do not have any high hopes that my
explanation will scotch forever the Inevitable Question.
Adams adapts an interesting thought-experiment of Mill's to suggest that my
conception of the good must be incomplete. Focusing on my claim that the orig-
inal function of ethics is the remedying of altruism failures, he asks if it would be
`a great joy and happiness' if all altruism failures were prevented. I am inclined
to think that a world in which all altruism failures were eliminated6 would be a
splendid thing, something truly worth rejoicing over, but quite apart from that,
my account is well-designed to answer the Millian question about the unending
quality of human aspirations. For integral to my approach is the idea that new
functions are constantly emerging in the articulation of the ethical project, and
I echo Mill's profound point that the evolution of our ethical practices makes
possible new forms of life for us, and shows our earlier conceptions of the good
to be `puerile'. Chapter 8 of EP emphasizes the open-ended character of our
search for the good. Because we develop new, and refined, ideas of what it is to
be human, the ethical project is never finished.
O'Connor et al. present the most sustained attempt to demonstrate that, like
so many previous efforts at ethical naturalism, mine too fails to avoid fallacy.
I have `tried and failed to somehow wring an ought from an is'. The authors
begin their essay by quoting a famous passage from Hume (one I also cite), as if
to suggest that that particular version of the problem dooms my enterprise.
This is, I think, an important error. Hume's problem can be formulated
in the following terms: specify a cogent mode of inference that will lead from
purely factual premises to an action-guiding conclusion. (This slightly amended
6 In a world of this type, there would be no occasion on which anyone would perceive others
as failing to make an appropriate response to them. For those whose desires were not taken
into account in a given course of action would understand the considerations that led to that
neglect, and would identify with them.
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characterization of the statement to be inferred is needed if one is to avoid
trivializing the problem by allowing `normative conclusions' that are conditional
in form or that are wide-scope negations of claims about what ought to be done;
see EP, 2545.) The significance of Hume's problem lies in its challenge to
the idea of justifying ethical claims, given a particular epistemological picture.
According to that picture, we have ways of discovering factual statements about
the world (and, some would add, truths of a different kindlogical, analytic,
conceptual, or what you will). If naturalists are to explain the justification of
ethical claims, they must do so on this basis. Hence the need for specifying the
cogent mode (or modes?) of inference.
Yet, as I hope EP makes clear, that epistemological picture is rejected. Ethics
starts in response to the fragility of hominid (or early human) social life, and,
throughout the ethical project, people acquire a mix of ethical and factual state-
ments, that they then modify throughout their lifetimes. The right analog of
Hume's question, concerns change of belief and commitments. The account of
EP is thoroughly pragmatist, following the dynamic approach to epistemology
common to Peirce, James, and Dewey. So a better version of the issue is how,
given an existing corpus of beliefs and ethical commitments, and given a new set
of factual discoveries, should people modify that corpus: what modes of transi-
tion are cogent? Given my proposal that ethics is social, something to be worked
out together, an even better formulation would ask for the specification of how
groups of people cogently revise their shared beliefs and commitments in light of
new factual information. Those who have read chapter 9 should recognize that
this is the task my discussion of method in ethics attempts to address. Hume's
classic challenge and the idea of `somehow wringing an ought from an is' have
been already considered and superseded.
Despite the fact that O'Connor come closer to recognizing the real question
as their essay proceeds, they never fully succeed in shaking the foundationalist
Humean epistemology from their arguments. I am supposed to be deriving `sub-
stantive conclusions about what our own approach to ethics should be' from my
genealogy; my normative stance is taken to be justified solely by its coherence;
and so forth. The best way to address their critique is, I think, to substitute the
characterizations of the last paragraph from their faulty specifications of what
needs to be done, and then to explain why I think I have met the real challenge.
Start with a point related to Adams' question about the possibility of ethical
experts. When ethical functions do not conflict, it is entirely possible that factual
information could teach us how to discharge a function (or set of functions) more
completely than hitherto. This is utterly unmysterious, and not particularly
interesting. Further, as 42 of EP argues, there are good reasons for taking us
to be committed to continuing the ethical project. The deep worry, then, is
whether there are ways of reasonably limiting disagreement about ways of going
forward, so that rampant pluralism is avoided. This is the worry raised in 43,
that gives rise to the exploration of a normative stance and of ethical method in
chapters 8 and 9, and that is finally addressed head-on in 56.
The source of the worry is the presence of functional conflict, and I approach it
by looking at a particular example of it: can one find any basis for responding to
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someone who believes that the original function of ethics has been transcended,
that we should now give priority to different functions? At this point coherence
enters the picture. Its role is not to justify a particular elaboration of ethical
practice ab initio. Rather, the aim is to take an existing body of factual knowl-
edge and ethical commitments, to absorb the previous conclusion that we are
embedded within the ethical project, to consider possible further developments
of it, one that subordinates or rejects the original function of ethics and one that
gives it priority, and to argue that the latter approach possesses a coherence the
former lacks. Coherence is here playing a far more limited role, one I believe it
can properly fill. Of course, if you are haunted by a foundationalist picture, if
you overlook the pragmatist character of my naturalism, and if you glide over
my references to Neurath's boat, you will continue to read me as making the
absurd claim that considerations of coherence can wring an ought from an is.
I shall close by elaborating the pragmatism, and trying to explain more con-
cretely what genealogy can show. As EP notes, the track record of progress
in the ethical project is spotty. Moreover, like Dewey, I take what progress we
have actually achieved to have been to a significant extent a matter of fortunate
power relationsthe voices of people who have hitherto been excluded became
too loud to ignore. Dewey's hope was for a more fully-developed ethical method
(which he thought of as analogous to the `experimental method' he supposed to
have emerged in the seventeenth century), that would enable future progress to
occur more regularly and more reliably. Part of my normative stance consists in
using my genealogy and my meta-ethics both to point out a possibly progres-
sive conception of the good and a possible method for continuing the project.
Given my emphasis on the social embedding of the project, and the importance
of widely-representative discussions, these proposals cannot be fully justified,
independently of their consideration and endorsement by others. Yet, I want to
say, it is reasonable, given the current state of the ethical project, and given my
understanding of the genealogy and its meta-ethical significance, to bring them
forward as proposals for wider discussion.
What underwrites thatcarefully circumscribed!claim of reasonableness?
I already confessed my answer: we can learn from history. Good histories often
lead people, reasonably lead them, to see their institutions, roles, social relations,
and lives differently. Genealogy can show you that you are not doing what you
thought you were doing. It can provide ways of viewing some ideas and insti-
tutions as distortions of a coherent project. It can offer you analogies between
historical situations and processes and current conditions. In particular, it can
enable you to see the ethical project differently, and, in light of some commit-
ments you cherish, to undertake revisions of some parts of your ethical practice.
Although I concede that the modes of reasoning in play here cannot be charac-
terized with the precision philosophers rightly prize in deductive logic, they are
not entirely opaque (see, for example, Gentner 2001 on analogical reasoning).7
Consider two examples of transitions in beliefs and commitments. One comes
from the history of the natural sciences, the decision by the community of
7 This book contains not only essays by Dedre Gentner and her collaborators, but also
contributions from others influenced by her ideas.
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chemists, over a period of two decades, to abandon phlogiston chemistry in
favor of Lavoisier's `new chemistry'. The other is my proposal that the problem
of remedying altruism failures now arises for us on a global scale. In both in-
stances, the arguments originally motivating discussions of the novel idea rest on
judgments about the urgency of particular problems and on suggested analogies
between one set of phenomena and others. In the chemical case, it is possible
to examine closely the reasoning offered by individual protagonists and by the
community as a whole, and, although I can give no formal account of it, I think
it can be presented in ways that make the reasonableness of the transition appar-
ent.8 I claim that the considerations advanced in chapter 8 of EP are analogous
to those offered at early stages of the debate about the `new chemistry'. We
can learn from genealogy, as scientists sometimes learn at moments of great up-
heaval. Specifically, we can come to see the tensions across contemporary human
life as analogous to the tensions within the small human groups in which the
ethical project first began. Perhaps the principal difference between ethics and
the natural sciences lies in the fact that the difficulties underlying the occasional
revolutions in the sciences arise more frequently in deciding how to go on with
the ethical project.
At this point, it is possible to address Baurmann's skepticism about whether
we should take our ancestors seriously. Baurmann's closing suggestion that we
can make our life a bit easier (this issue, 50) misses an important part of the
strategy of EP, namely that the historical reconstruction is needed to expand our
meta-ethical possibilities, liberating us from the range of options philosophers
have taken to be on offer. The analytical history is supposed to be the basis
not only of Part III but of Part II, as well. Beyond that, I think Baurmann
falls into the same trap as O'Connor et al., in that he underestimates the power
of genealogy to reveal to us what we have been up to. If my Deweyan hopes
for a more systematic exploration of ethical issues are to be realized, then it
will be important to identify the places in which the ethical project has been
distorted in the growth of larger societies. In effect, my normative proposals
rest on attempting to depict the history of our ethical practices as one in which
the human situation (Dewey's `conditions of human life') posed an important
problem for our living together, in which our ancestors devised strategies for
coping with a few very simple instances of that problem, in which their successes
enabled their social lives and their aspirations to develop in ways they could
never have conceived, and in which that process of development removed some
important parts of the strategies for tackling the instances of the basic problem
that emerged in the wider societies. If you see things that way, you will perhaps
be led to conceive our ethical life differently, and to entertain the proposals I
make in my `Normative Stance'. Genealogy gives a gestalt on ourselves we didn't
previously have, and the change of gestalt canreasonablybe consequential.
Despite my conviction that their critique arises from a misformulation of
the challenge for ethical naturalism, I am especially grateful to O'Connor et al.
for their determined efforts to raise the Inevitable Question, in that I hope my
remarks will enable future discussions of it to begin in the right place (as noted,
8 See the discussion in chapter 7 of The Advancement of Science.
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I dare not hope that the question will disappear). And let me end as I began,
with an expression of gratitude to all the essayists for taking my proposals as
seriously as they have.
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